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Abstract
Financial planners typically advise people to shift investments away from
stocks and toward bonds as they age. The planners commonly justify this
advice in three ways. They argue that stocks are less risky over a young
person’s long investment horizon, that stocks are often necessary for young
people to meet large financial obligations (like college tuition for their
children), and that younger people have more years of labor income ahead
with which to recover from the potential losses associated with stock
ownership. This article uses economic reasoning to evaluate these three
different justifications. It finds that the first two arguments do not make
economic sense. The last argument is valid—but only for people with labor
income that is relatively uncorrelated with stock returns. If a person’s labor
income is highly correlated with stock returns, then that investor is better off
shifting investments toward stocks over time.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Most ﬁnancial planners advise their clients to shift their in-
vestmentsawayfromstocksandtowardbondsastheyage.
For example, in The Wall Street Journal Guide to Plan-
ning Your Financial Future, Kenneth Morris, Alan Siegel,
and Virginia Morris (1995, p. 7) tell people to make sure
that the percentage of wealth they have in bonds is no
more than their age. Similarly, Jane Bryant Quinn (1991,
p.489),investmentcolumnistforNewsweek,tellsinvestors
to “tip toward higher risks if you . . . are young.” And in
the classic book A Random Walk Down Wall Street, Bur-
ton Malkiel (1996, p. 411) advises “more common stocks
for individuals early in the life cycle and more bonds for
those nearer to retirement”; he says that “the longer the
time period over which you can hold on to your invest-
ments, the greater should be the share of common stocks
in your portfolio” (Malkiel 1996, pp. 404–405).
Despite their general agreement that investors should
switch from stocks to bonds as they age, ﬁnancial plan-
ners give different reasons for recommending this invest-
ment policy. At least three reasons are commonly offered.
First, many ﬁnancial planners argue, as does Malkiel
(1996, p. 403), that “a substantial amount...o ft h erisk
of common-stock investment can be eliminated by adopt-
ing a program of long-term ownership,” and, of course,
older people don’t have as many years ahead of them as
do younger people. Second, some ﬁnancial planners em-
phasize that asset allocation is often shaped by the ne-
cessity of meeting relatively large obligations in midlife,
such as college tuition for children. To meet these ﬁnan-
cial targets, investing a lot in stocks may be necessary for
a while, but not after enough resources have accumulated.
And ﬁnally, some ﬁnancial planners point out, as again
Malkiel (1996, p. 400) does, that a younger person “can
use wages to cover any losses from increased risk” while
an older person cannot.
In this article, we use standard economic models of in-
vestorbehaviortoevaluateeachoftheseexplanations.
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conclude that the low long-term risk of stocks explanation
and the targeting explanation have little validity. The only
explanation that holds up as solid justiﬁcation for the stock
holding advice is the fact that younger people have many
years of wages available to them while older people do
not.
We begin by documenting that, as Malkiel and others
state, stocks are much more likely to outperform bonds
over long horizons than over short horizons; in this sense,
stocks become less risky over longer horizons. However,
we show that this fact is irrelevant for investors, for two
reasons. One reason is obvious: if investors can rebalance
their portfolios over time, a long horizon is basically the
same as a short horizon; what matters for investment deci-
sions is the length of time between rebalancing, not the in-
vestment horizon itself. The other reason for the irrele-
vance of low long-term risk is subtler. Even if investors
can’t rebalance their portfolios, they have to be concerned
about the potential for enormous losses that can be in-
curred by holding stocks over long periods of time. For
example, over a 30-year period, the events of 1929 can
occur 30 times; those same events can only occur once in
a one-year period. While having 30 such poor years in a
row may be exceedingly unlikely, we show that according
to standard economic models of investor choice, investors
are concerned about the magnitude of these potential loss-
es, not just their probability. Standard models predict that
because of this concern, investors will split their wealth
between stocks and bonds in the same way, independent
of the length of their investment horizon. We conclude that
the reduction in the riskiness of stocks over longer hori-
zons does not justify the common advice of ﬁnancial plan-
ners.
We look next at the explanation that asset allocation is
often shaped by large needs in midlife—some targets that
must be hit, such as enough ﬁnancial wealth to pay for
college tuition for children. We ﬁnd that when confronted
with such a need, some investors will indeed ﬁnd their
best move is to switch from stocks to bonds over time.
Generally, though, such a switch is extremely dramatic,
not the gradual reductions typically recommended by ﬁ-
nancial planners. Moreover, whether investors actually
switch toward bonds or away from bonds as they age
depends crucially on the size of their target, their initial
wealth, and the loss associated with failing to hit the tar-
get. Since an optimal plan is so dependent on investor-
speciﬁc variables, we conclude that this explanation does
not justify ﬁnancial planners generally recommending risk
reduction as investors age.
Finally, we consider the explanation that the life-cycle
behavior of labor income shapes investor behavior. We
ﬁnd that there is a good economic justiﬁcation for this ex-
planation. When investors are young, they have a long
stream of future income. As they age, this stream shortens,
so the value of their human capital falls. (If labor income
is rising over time, the value of human capital may rise
initially, but eventually it has to fall because the amount
of time left before retirement starts to shrink at a very fast
rate.)Thebestwayforinvestorstorespondtothissituation
is to shift the risk composition of their ﬁnancial wealth in
order to offset the decline in the value of their human cap-
ital. For most people, labor income either is risk free or is
dominated by person-speciﬁc risk that is only weakly cor-
related with stock returns. So most investors need to shift
their ﬁnancial wealth toward bonds and away from stocks
as they age in order to make up for the loss in human cap-
ital. We conclude that substituting for lost labor income is
the only valid reason for ﬁnancial planners’ advice that
clients shift their portfolios toward relatively riskless
instruments as they age.
The mathematics behind our analysis is hardly new; it
was ﬁrst derived in Robert Merton’s (1971) classic paper.
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Why do we ﬁnd it necessary to reemphasize the lessons of
his work? We have a very practical reason: today many
more investors than ever before are able to control their
own asset allocations. This can only be done intelligently
if one knows the basis of the ﬁnancial planners’ advice.
For example, suppose a young investor has an income
stream that is highly correlated with stock returns. Finan-
cial planners generally would advise this person to invest
less in stocks as time passes. We show that this investor
should not do that, but rather should invest more in stocks
in order to make up for the loss of labor income.
3
Risk in the Long Run
First we consider the argument that younger investors
should invest more in stocks than older investors because
stocks are less risky over longer investment horizons. We
show that there is certainly a sense in which stocks are
less risky over longer horizons. However, we also showthat this does not mean that investors will be better off if
they invest signiﬁcantly more in stocks when their invest-
ment horizon is longer.
We begin by documenting the historical behavior of re-
turns on stocks and U.S. Treasury bills (T-bills) over the
period 1926–90 (as reported in Ibbotson Associates 1992).
During these 65 years, the average annual real return to
the stocks of the 500 large ﬁrms in Standard & Poor’s
stock price index (the S&P 500) was about 8.8 percent per
year. (The average of the logarithm of the gross real re-
turn was 6.5 percent.) Over the same period, T-bill real re-
turns averaged about 0.6 percent. Thus, stocks earned a
remarkable 8.2 percentage point annual premium over T-
bills. Stocks, of course, were much more variable: the
standard deviation of the annual real return to the S&P 500
was about 21 percent. (The standard deviation of the loga-
rithm of the gross real return was 20 percent.) In contrast,
the standard deviation of the annual real return to T-bills
was only about 4.4 percent.
FollowingMalkiel(1996),investmentadvisersgeneral-
ly emphasize two features of these data. First, bills outper-
formed stocks in 20 years out of a possible 65. Second,
the sample has 46 possible blocks of 20 consecutive years.
In none of these blocks did bills outperform stocks. These
facts are generally interpreted as saying that while stocks
are risky over short horizons, they are guaranteed to out-
perform bills over a 20-year period.
Unfortunately, this conclusion is somewhat premature.
While the sample has 46 possible blocks of 20 consecutive
years, it has only 3 nonoverlapping (independent) blocks
of 20 years. This means that the sample itself contains lit-
tle direct information about the long-run performance of
stocks compared to bills. We need to augment the sample
information with information from economic theory and
construct a statistical model of stock and bond returns. We
canthenusethatmodeltoaddressquestionsaboutthelong
run.
We obtain this additional theoretical information from
what is known as the random walk hypothesis. This theory
is based on the following simple logic. Stock prices reﬂect
all available information, which means that stock prices
change only if news arrives. News is by deﬁnition unpre-
dictable. Hence, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, stock price
changes are unpredictable.
We embed this theoretical reasoning in a statistical
model by assuming that stock returns are independent and
identically distributed over time.
4 We then assume that
logged stock returns are normally distributed,
5 with mean,
or expectation, and standard deviation (µS and sS, respec-
tively) equal to their sample values, 6.5 percent and 20
percent. We ignore the relatively small variability of T-bill
returnsandassumethat,withinthemodel,bondreturnsare
constant at 0.5 percent per year. As is common in mod-
ern dynamic economics, we model households as having
rational expectations: they know that stock and bond re-
turns behave in the way described by our statistical model.
Usingthisstatisticalmodel,wecanassesstheclaimthat
stocks are guaranteed to outperform bonds over long
enough horizons. Suppose someone has a dollar to invest.
If he or she were to put all of it into stocks, then the loga-
rithm of the amount of wealth this investor would have af-
ter T years, ln(WT), would be random, with mean µST and
standard deviation sST
1/2. But if the investor were to put
the dollar into T-bills, then ln(WT) would be nonrandom
and equal to ln(1.005)T.
Notice that the mean of the difference between the two
portfolios’ payoffs increases linearly with T. But the stan-
dard deviation of the stock portfolio’s payoff increases
much more slowly—only linearly with T
1/2. Thus, when T
increases from 1 to 30, the mean difference increases by a
factor of 30, while the standard deviation increases by a
factor of only 5.5. This means that for large T, the mean of
the difference between the two portfolios’ payoffs is going
to be large and positive relative to the standard deviation
of this difference. Hence, for large T, the difference in the
payoffs is very unlikely to be negative.
This intuition is illustrated quantitatively in Chart 1. It
shows that according to our statistical model, over a one-
year period, the stock portfolio outperforms the bond port-
foliowithaprobabilityofapproximately0.6.However,the
probability of getting a better return with stocks over a 30-
year period is 0.95. Thus, our statistical model does imply
that over long periods of time, bonds are highly unlikely to
outperform stocks;
6 yet the model also implies that there is
some (albeit small) probability that bonds will outperform
stocks even over 30-year horizons.
We did a test to check the ability of our statistical mod-
el to ﬁt the long-run properties of the data. First, we simu-
lated 1,000 samples of length 65. In each of these sam-
ples, we looked at the 46 possible blocks of 20 consecu-
tive years. In 500 of the samples, bonds failed to outper-
form stocks in any of the 46 possible 20-year periods.
Data like those displayed in Chart 1 are often used to
justify the advice that younger people should invest more
in stocks than older people: because stocks are more likely
to do better than bonds over the long haul, ﬁnancial advis-
ers recommend investing more in stocks when the invest-
ment horizon is long. But this reasoning ignores two cru-
cial aspects of optimal portfolio allocation. First, investors
can readjust their portfolios over time. With an ability to
rebalance, how is a long horizon different from a short ho-
rizon? Second, most households are concerned not just
with the probability of loss, but also with the magnitude of
the loss. Now we evaluate the relevance of Chart 1, given
these two issues.
Tounderstandtheimportanceoftheﬁrstissue,consider
the decision problem of a household which has $W0 avail-
able today to invest. The household’s goal is to maximize
the expected value of a utility function U(WT), where WT
is the amount of wealth the household will accumulate
over T periods.
7 The form of the utility function U is an
important determinant of the household’s behavior. Stan-
dard dynamic economic models assume that households
have objective functions




where the parameter g represents the level of risk aversion.
According to this objective function, households with
$10,000 to invest will split their wealth (W) between
stocks and bonds in the same way as households with
$100,000 to invest. When the parameter g is high, house-
holds are more risk averse and will invest less money in
stocks. Generally, economists restrict the parameter g to liebetween 0 and 10. (For a closer look at risk aversion, see
the accompanying box.)
We assume that the household can invest in two differ-
ent accounts. One is a stock mutual fund with annual real
returns rt
s. As before, we assume that returns are indepen-
dent and identically distributed over time and that logged
returns, ln(1+rt
s), are normal with mean 6.5 percent and
standard deviation 20 percent. The other account is a bond
mutual fund that pays a constant real return r
b = 0.5 per-
cent. The household chooses its stock holdings st and its







(3) WT = ST−1(1+rT
s)+B T −1(1+r
b)
(4) St + Bt £ (1+rt
s)St−1 + (1+r
b)Bt−1
for 1 £ t £ T − 1 and subject to
(5) S0 + B0 £ W0
for W0 given. In this problem, St and Bt are the amounts of
money that the household invests in stocks and bonds, re-
spectively,in period t.Thehousehold beginslifewith$W0.
We can solve the household’s problem backward. At
the end of period T − 1, the household has WT−1 dollars.
It chooses the share sT−1 º ST−1/WT−1 of this wealth to in-






Here, the expectation averages the household’s payoff
from its portfolio over the possible realizations of rt
s. The
key feature of this optimization problem is that the house-
hold’s choice of sT−1 is independent of its wealth WT−1; the
household’s utility function has constant relative risk aver-
sion. In fact, because rt
s is independent over time, the
household’s choice of sT−1 equals s* in all states, where s*







This ﬁrst-order condition equates the marginal beneﬁts of
investing in stocks and bonds.
Now that we know how the household will solve its
problem in period T − 1, we can work backward to ﬁgure
out its optimal portfolio in period T − 2. In that period,
the household realizes that in period T − 1, it will invest
a share s* of its wealth in stocks. It takes this into account
when deciding how much to invest in period T − 2 and












−1 is independent over time, we can separate the
expectation of the product into the product of the expecta-










The household’s objective is thus the same in period T −
2 as in period T − 1. So it is optimal for the household to
set sT−2 equal to s*. We can keep rolling this logic back-
ward in time to conclude that it is optimal for st to equal
s* in every date and state.
Intuitively, we know that the investment decision of a
householdwithconstantrelativeriskaversionisalwaysin-
dependentofthehousehold’scurrentwealthlevel—infact,
that’s essentially the deﬁnition of constant relative risk
aversion.Moreover,weassumethatstockreturnsareinde-
pendent and identically distributed over time, so that the
household’s current beliefs about next period’s returns are
always the same. Thus, long investment horizons are no
different from short investment horizons as long as house-
holds are making decisions at regular intervals.
In the real world, transaction costs lead households to
change their portfolios only infrequently. Let’s see how
this restriction on household behavior affects portfolio al-
location. Suppose that in our model, households can only
splittheirinitialwealthW0betweenstocksandbonds;after
that investment decision, they can never move resources
from one fund to another. Then, after T periods, the house-
hold’s wealth is random:
(10) WT =[ S 0(1+r1
s)(1+r2
s)(1+r3
s)...( 1 + r T
s)]
+( W 0− S 0)(1+r
b)T
where S0 is the amount of wealth that the household puts
into the stock market account today. Again, the optimal
S0/W0 is independent of W0. The household chooses S0 so
astomaximizeE{(WT)
1−g}/(1−g).Thismaximizationprob-
lem is easy to solve using numerical methods.
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Table 1 describes how the share of wealth that a house-
hold will invest in the stock market s depends on the hori-
zon T and on the risk aversion parameter g. We ﬁnd that
when households have coefficients of relative risk aver-
sion at least as high as 2, then the portion s is virtually in-
dependent
11 of T. At ﬁrst, this result seems paradoxical;
after all, as T grows, so does the probability that stocks
will outperform bonds. But there is another effect. Sup-
pose each time a coin is ﬂipped, an individual receives $2
if the coin shows heads, but loses $1 if the coin shows
tails. If the coin is ﬂipped once, the individual can lose up
to $1. However, if the coin is ﬂipped 30 times, the indi-
vidual can lose up to $30 (although the probability of do-
ing so is quite small). Table 1 says that for households
with constant relative risk aversion, the increased potential
forverypoorperformance associatedwithlong-term stock
investments almost exactly offsets the increased potential
for very good performance.
Infact,inawell-deﬁnedsense,portfolioscomposeden-
tirely of stocks may become less attractive over longer ho-
rizons to households that are sufficiently risk averse. Sup-
pose households are asked how much they would have to
invest in a stock portfolio to be indifferent between it and
$1 invested in the household’s optimalportfolio (assuming
no rebalancing) or in a bond portfolio. The answer to this
question is in Table 2. It shows that over a 40-year hori-
zon, a household with coefficient of relative risk aversionequal to 5 prefers $1 invested in the optimal portfolio to
anything less than $3.86 invested in the stock portfolio.
Even more surprising, the household prefers $1 invested
in a bond portfolio to anything less than $2.22 invested in
the stock portfolio—even though the stock portfolio out-
performs the bond portfolio with a probability of 97 per-
cent. Risk averse households are clearly highly concerned
with the possibility for extreme losses when stocks don’t
do well, even though this is a very unlikely event.
Thus, despite the apparent attractiveness of stocks over
the long haul, the length of the investment horizon does
not greatly affect the investment decisions of households
with constant relative risk aversion utility functions. If
these investors can freely rebalance their portfolios, they
are essentially facing a sequence of one-period decision
problems, regardless of the length of their investment hori-
zons. Even if they can’t rebalance freely, they regard the
increased downside risk generated by longer investment
horizons as a counter to the increased upside potential de-
picted in Chart 1.
Targeting
Now we consider the argument that investors generally
should reduce their stock holdings over time because they
are saving for a particular target level of wealth (especially
for midlife obligations like college tuition for their chil-
dren).
One way to capture this idea is to assume that the
household derives utility from ﬁnal wealth WT according












( W T − W ¯) 1−g/(1−g), if WT ³ W ¯
−L ,i f W T< W ¯
.
According to this objective function, the household treats
¯ W as a target. It receives utility from any amount exceed-
ing ¯ Waccording tothe constant relative riskaversion func-
tiondescribedearlier. Failingtoachieve ¯ W resultsinaneg-
ative amount of utility. For now, we set this loss L = ¥,s o
thatnopotentialgaincanoutweigheventheslightestprob-
ability of failing to reach the target. While seemingly ex-
treme, this speciﬁcation of L is common in economics be-
cause it is the only value of L for which the function in
(11) is concave.
We have seen that if a household can rebalance its port-
folio costlessly and it has no target level of wealth, it will
always keep the same proportion of wealth in stocks. How
does targeting affect this result? To answer this, suppose
ﬁrst that ¯ W/(1+r
b)
T ³ W0. This condition means that the
household can exceed its target by simply investing all of
its funds in the risk-free asset. The household then follows
a two-step investment procedure. First, it always invests
enough money in bonds so as to deﬁnitely achieve the tar-
get (because not achieving it has such dire consequences).
Second, the household invests a constant share s* of any
additional money into stocks [where s* satisﬁes the ﬁrst-
order condition (7)].
This immediately means that the household invests a
smaller share of its wealth in stocks than it would have if
it did not have a target. But as time goes by, the household
accumulates wealth, and because it invests in both stocks
and bonds, its wealth typically grows faster than the inter-
est rate. Hence, as the household approaches retirement,
it has to use proportionately fewer of its resources to be
sure of achieving its target ¯ W. This frees up more funds
for stock investment. It follows that over time a targeting
household tends to increase the share of its wealth in
stocks, not decrease it as ﬁnancial planners advise.
All of this analysis presumes that the target can be
reached by using only bonds. Suppose instead that the
household is faced with a target that cannot be reached in
that way; that is, its target ¯ W > W0(1+r
b)
T. This means that
no matter what investment strategy the household uses,
thereisalwayssomeprobabilityofnotachievingthetarget
and so getting utility equal to −¥. Therefore, when the tar-
get is so large relative to its initial wealth, the household
views all strategies asequally bad and isindifferent among
all possible investment strategies.
This implication may strike many readers as somewhat
strange. In response to that likely reaction, we explore in
the Appendix what happens if we change the loss L to
some less extreme amount. There we show that situations
exist in which, if L equals zero, then the household tends
to invest a smaller share of its resources in stocks over
time. However, this behavior is only optimal for a narrow
range of target-to-wealth ratios. Because of this lack of ro-
bustness, we conclude that targeting does not justify the
advice ﬁnancial planners generally give their clients, to
lower the share of their portfolios in stocks over time.
Labor Income
So far, we have implicitly modeled the household as re-
ceiving all of its income in the form of interest, capital
gains, and dividends. This assumption probably accurately
describes only a few actual households in the United
States: most derive much of their income from working in
the labor force. Now we broaden our model and discover
that this other type of income provides the most convinc-
ing justiﬁcation for the stock holding advice of ﬁnancial
planners.
Suppose that a household receives a salary yt in period
t and begins its working life with an initial amount of
stocks and bonds. The household can invest its salary in
both stocks and bonds and can costlessly rebalance its
portfolio at the end of each period. Here, as before, we as-
sume that the household’s objective is to maximize the ex-
pectation of the utility function with constant relative risk
aversion, (WT)
1−g/(1−g), where WT is its wealth at the end







(13) WT = yT + ST(1+rT
s)+B T −1(1+r
b)
(14) St + Bt £ yt + (1+rt
s)St−1 + (1+r
b)Bt−1
for 1 £ t £ T − 1 and subject to
(15) S0 + B0 £ W0
for W0 given. In this problem, as before, St and Bt are the
amounts of money that the household invests in stocks and
bonds, respectively, in period t.
The solution to this problem depends on the fact that
the household has two types of wealth. One is its ﬁnancialwealth (FW), the money that it has invested in stocks and
bonds. Mathematically, we can express this as
(16) FWt º yt + (1+rt
s)St−1 + (1+r
b)Bt−1.
The other type of wealth is the household’s labor wealth,
its sequence of future salary payments, (yt+1,yt+2,yt+3,...).
The risk characteristics of this second type of wealth play
a crucial role in determining the household’s optimal split
of its ﬁnancial wealth between stocks and bonds. Suppose,
for example, that the salary yt equals a constant y in every
period. Then the household’s salary payments are, in risk
terms, equivalent to the payments it would receive from a
largerisk-freeannuity.Sincethehouseholdisalreadyhold-
ing a large amount of wealth in a risk-free asset, it will
compensate by investing more of its resources in stocks.
12
The mathematical formalization of this basic intuition
is useful and simple. If the household’s salary is constant
over time, then at the end of any period t, the present val-
ue of its future salary payments equals







(Note that we can discount the future payments by the
risk-free rate because they are risk free.) Earlier, in equa-
tion (7), we saw that a household with constant relative
risk aversion wants to have a constant share s* of its total







Now, with two types of wealth, at the end of any period
t, the household will set St to equal
(19) St = s*(Total Wealth)=s *( FWt+PVYt).
The crucial aspect of this last formula is that the ratio of
ﬁnancial wealth to labor wealth is not constant over time.
Consequently, even though the share of total wealth held
in stocks does not change over time, the share of ﬁnancial
wealth held in stocks does:
(20) St/FWt = s*[ 1+( PVYt/FWt)].
Since FWt is random, we cannot state with certainty
how St/FWt changes over time. However, we can infer
how St/FWt is likely to change. Two forces are at work.
One is that, as the household gets closer to retirement, it
has fewer salary payments left to receive, and the present
value of its future salary payments falls. The other force
at work is that, as time passes, the household accumulates
more stocks and bonds, so FWt tends to rise. Because of
these twoforces,thehousehold’s optimalplanwilltypical-
ly be to reduce St/FWt over time.
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This analysis is purely qualitative. Chart 2 offers a feel
for the magnitudes of the changes in stock holdings in-
volved. It depicts how the share of ﬁnancial wealth held in
stocks changes over time for a household that has $20,000
per year available for investment from its salary income
and that has a risk aversion coefficient equal to 5. (Returns
from stocks and T-bills follow the statistical model we
discussed earlier.) The household begins its working life
at age 25 with no ﬁnancial wealth; the chart depicts what
happens to its path of stock holdings from age 36 until its
last investment decision before retirement at age 64. Of
course, for any particular household, the path of stock
holdings is random (because stock returns ﬂuctuate over
time). Chart 2, therefore, displays the median path of stock
holdings over 1,000 randomly drawn time paths of stock
returns. It shows that at age 36, the household should have
nearly 85 percent of its ﬁnancial wealth in stocks; by age
64, this share drops below 40 percent.
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While striking, this analysis has an obvious weakness:
households do not actually receive constant salaries. In-
stead, from year to year, a typical household does not
know what the real value of its income will be. Random
salaries mean that the composition of a household’s port-
folioovertimedependscruciallyonthedegreeofcomove-
ment between the household’s salary and the return to the
stock market.
To make this dependence clear, consider the extreme
exampleofthemanagerofamutualfund.Supposethatthe
growth rate of the manager’s income always equals the
growthrateofaggregatedividends.Then,fromariskpoint
of view, the manager’s future labor income is essentially
equivalent to having a lot of money invested in stocks. As
the manager approaches retirement,the value of this future
labor income falls. That implicitly reduces the share of the
manager’s wealth that is highly correlated with the stock
market. The manager uses ﬁnancial assets to compensate
for this change by investing more in stocks over time.
This story suggests that households should invest more
in stocks over time. Of course, the premise of the reason-
ing is that the growth rate of household salaries is highly
correlated with dividend growth, which is unrealistic for
many people; after all, not everyone is a mutual fund man-
ager. In fact, based on their examination of microeconom-
ic evidence on household labor income, John Heaton and
Deborah Lucas (1996) ﬁnd that most households have in-
comes that are not highly correlated with the performance
of the stock market.
15 With this statistical characterization,
even though wages are risky, households think of bonds as
a closer substitute than stocks for their labor income.
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Consequently, the optimal plan for many households is the
advice ﬁnancial planners give: when you’re young, offset
current and future labor income by holding a lot of stocks;
as time passes and fewer periods remain in which to earn
labor income, compensate by increasing bond holdings.
17
Conclusion
The life-cycle advice of ﬁnancial planners is now so wide-
ly known that it can be termed folk wisdom: older people
should invest less in stocks than younger people do. But
why should they? We have here used standard economic
reasoning to evaluate three reasons that are offered by
many ﬁnancial planners, and we have shown that only one
of them makes economic sense.
That one has to do with the fact that as investors age,
they have fewer years of labor income ahead of them. If—
as is true for most people—an investor’s labor income is
notdirectlycorrelatedwithstockreturns,thenoureconom-
ic analysis concludes that the investor should follow the ﬁ-
nancial planners’ advice: as time passes, shift more ﬁnan-
cial wealth out of stocks and into bonds.
That’s not good advice for investors who are not like
most people, though. If an investor’s labor income is high-ly correlated with stock returns, then our economic analy-
sis demonstrates that the investor is likely to be better off
ignoringthecommon adviceofﬁnancial planners.Instead,
such an investor should do the opposite of what ﬁnancial
planners say: as time passes, shift more ﬁnancial wealth
out of bonds and into stocks.
*The authors thank Karen Hovermale for valuable research assistance; Rao
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McCutcheon, Sergio Rebelo, and Chuck Whiteman for many discussions in the distant
past about the issues in this article.
1Other justiﬁcations for this type of variation in stock holdings over the life cycle
can, of course, be constructed. But we choose to focus on those most often used by ﬁ-
nancial planners.
2The mathematical analysis is also restated as a special case of the analysis in Zvi
Bodie, Robert Merton, and William Samuelson’s (1992) paper. They are more explicit
than Merton (1971) in discussing the implications of his original analysis for portfolio
dynamicsover the life cycle.Our conclusions about the roleof labor income essentially
mirror theirs.
3Weshouldnotethatourmodelconsistentlyoverpredictstheamountofstockhold-
ings of households at every stage of the life cycle. This is because we abstract from
taxes, real estate investment, short-sale constraints, borrowing restrictions, and endoge-
nous labor supply (among other things). We know that ignoring these elements affects
the predictions of our model for the quantitative path of stock holdings over the life
cycle. But our goal here is limited: we simply want to determine qualitatively whether
any of the explanations for the common investment advice is robust.
So far, no economic model has satisfactorily explained the low level of stock hold-
ings given the large difference in average returns between stocks and U.S. Treasury
bills (T-bills). Thisis essentially a partialequilibrium manifestation of theequity premi-
um puzzle: no satisfactory general equilibrium model is simultaneously consistent with
the low variability of per capita consumption growth and the wide spread between av-
erage stock and T-bill returns. See the article by Narayana Kocherlakota (1996).
4The theoretical argument actually implies only that investors have no information
available that allows them to forecast mean returns. We strengthen this assumption to
independence. Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (1988) present evidence that stock
returns have a predictable component. However, the sampling errors associated with
estimates of predictability are very large. [See the work of Robert Hodrick (1992, Table
4, Panel D).] Given the theoretical argument and the lack of empirical evidence, a con-
servative view for planning purposes is to assume no predictability.
5Theassumptionofnormalityisnotabadapproximationfortheempiricaldistribu-
tion of stock returns (except for some events in the left tail of the distribution). More
important, the normality assumption is made purely for analytical convenience; using
the empirical distribution instead would not affect any of our conclusions.
6Actually, this is true in any model in which stocks have a higher population mean
return than bonds.
7Throughout this article, we ignore the consumption/saving decision of the house-
hold and focus only on the portfolio allocation problem. Merton (1971) shows that the
household’sportfolioallocationdecisioncanbefoundseparatelyfromitsconsumption/
saving decision if returns are independent and identically distributed over time, if the
household has constant relative risk aversion (or what we call concave targeting) pref-
erences which are separable from leisure, and if the household faces no short-sale con-
straints or uninsurable income risk.
8This assumption is made for one key reason: even though per capita consumption
has gone up by about eight times in the United States in the last 130 years, real rates
of return have remained relatively steady. This would not be true if household objective
functions exhibited increasing or decreasing relative risk aversion.
9Note that we do not constrain sT−1 in any way. Except for the nonconcave objec-
tive discussed in the Appendix, we do not impose short-sale or borrowing constraints.
We conjecture that imposing these would not change the ﬂavor of our results; but actu-
ally solving the optimization problems while imposing these constraints is a problem
beyond our scope here.
10Speciﬁcally, we solve the problem by approximating the standard normal distri-
bution by a 10-point discrete distribution that has the same ﬁrst 19 moments as the
standard normal. Using an approximating 9-point discrete distribution delivers much
the same results.
11Note that in Table 1, households that have low risk aversion (a coefficient less
than 4) prefer to invest more in stocks over longer horizons, while those with high risk
aversion (a coefficient greater than or equal to 4) prefer to invest less in stocks over
longerhorizons.Thisreversalinbehaviorhappensbecausethehighlyriskaversehouse-
holds are more concerned with the possibility for more dramatic losses over longer ho-
rizons.
12Throughout this section, we assume that households cannot adjust their earnings
in response to stock market performance. Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992) show
that if households can freely choose effort at every point in time, then they choose to
increase effort whenever stocks do poorly. This induces an endogenous negative corre-
lation between stock returns and labor earnings; correspondingly, households tend to
invest relatively more in stocks and to decrease the portion invested in stocks more rap-
idly when they are younger than when they are older.
José Víctor Ríos-Rull (1994) considers a model in which households have nonsep-
arable preferences over consumption and leisure and labor earnings are perfectly posi-
tivelycorrelatedwithstock returns.Hismodelpredicts thatolderhouseholdshold more
stocks than younger households.
13Hereisapreciselywordedtheoremwhichsummarizesthatanalysis.Supposethat
yt = y for all t and that prob(rt
s > 0) > 1/2 (as is true in our statistical model). Then
prob(st/FWt < st−1/FWt−1) > 1/2. More generally, suppose that the sequence of salary
payments is risk free, with a constant growth rate g. It is easy to show that there exists
t
* such that PVYt/PVYt−1 < 1 for t > t
*. Then the following statements are both true:
• If prob(rt
s > 0) > 1/2, then prob(st/FWt < st−1/FWt−1)>1 / 2f o rt>t
*.
• If prob(rt
s > g) > 1/2, then prob(st/FWt < st−1/FWt−1) > 1/2 for all t.
14Actually,Chart2dramaticallyunderstatesthesizeofthedeclineinstockholdings.
Early in a household’s working life, the optimal ﬁnancial plan for the household is to
borrow heavily and invest the proceeds in stocks. Indeed, at age 26, the median house-
hold’s optimal plan is to invest about $340,000 in stocks—having borrowed $320,000
of that amount. (Of course, that $320,000 is but a small portion of the present value of
the household’s labor income.) While seemingly extreme, this is certainly in keeping
withthestandardﬁnancialplanners’advicetoinvestasmuchaspossibleinstockswhen
young. (Solving the problem while imposing borrowing constraints is much more chal-
lengingand iscertainlybeyond thescope ofthisarticle. However,wedoubt thatimpos-
ing such constraints would change the shape of Chart 2.)
15More speciﬁcally, Heaton and Lucas (1996) look at a sample of households from
the Panel Study in Income Dynamics. For each household, they use time series data to
get a sample estimate of the correlation of labor income growth with the return to the
Center for Researchin SecurityPrices value-weighted portfolio.Heaton and Lucasﬁnd
that in this set of household-speciﬁc correlation estimates, the median is 0.02.
Ravi Jagannathan and Zhenyu Wang (1996) argue that portfolios of stocks can be
constructed that have returns which are positively correlated with aggregate labor in-
comegrowth(evenconditionalonaggregatemarketconditions).Notethattheseﬁndings
arenotinconsistentwiththoseofHeatonandLucas(1996).Thecorrelationforatypical
household may be much lower than the correlation of aggregate or per capita labor in-
comegrowthwiththevalue-weightedreturn.Individualhouseholdlaborincomefeatures
a large amount of job-speciﬁc risk (disability and bad matches, for example) that is es-
sentiallyuncorrelatedwiththestockmarket;thisjob-speciﬁcriskcancelswhenindivid-
ual labor income is added up across individuals to create aggregate labor income. Of
course,forourpurposes,householdorindividuallaborincomeisthevariableofinterest.
16IntheAppendix,weprovethatiftheequitypremiumislargeenoughandthepre-
cautionary motive is small enough or both, then in a one-period setting, investors view
risk-freebondsassubstitutesforriskylaborincomethatisindependentofstockreturns.
17In the Appendix, we describe some numerical simulations in a three-period envi-
ronment that conﬁrm this intuition. Neither Merton’s (1971) analysis nor that of Bodie,
Merton,andSamuelson(1992)treatsthiscaseinwhichlaborincomeriskisnotperfect-
ly correlated with stock market risk. In the current economic literature, we know of no
numericaloranalyticalsolutionsinthisincompletemarketscaseforhouseholdsthatlive
for a large but ﬁnite number of periods.
Appendix
Numerical and Analytical Details
Here we provide more detailed arguments for some points made
in the preceding paper.
The Targeting Mentality
Firstwedemonstratethatsometargetingsituationsexistinwhich
stock investments are likely to shrink over time.
We examine the behavior of a household that is two years
from retirement and faces a nonconcave objective function. The
household solves the following problem:
(A1) max EU(W2)
subject to








(A4) S0 + B0 £ W0
for W0 given and, for t = 0, 1, subject to
(A5) St ³ 0
(A6) Bt ³ 0.
Note that in this problem, we impose short-sale and borrowing
constraints to ensure the existence of a maximum. We assume
that the stock return rt
s has three equally likely realizations: 0.20,
0.01, and −0.18; the bond return r
b is equal to 0.005. (The low
average return of the stock is necessary in order to generate any
nondegenerate dynamics in portfolio holdings because in thisexercise we assume relatively low levels of risk aversion.) The
crucial aspect of the problem is that U(W2) equals (W2− ¯ W)
1/2 if
W2 ³ ¯ W and 0 otherwise. This function is, of course, noncon-
cave.
We solve the one-period version of this problem by solving
for the unique S1 that satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions and then
comparing the utility of that point with the utility of investing all
funds in stocks. (Investing all funds in bonds is clearly subopti-
mal.) Given this one-period solution (which can be made very
precise), we solve the two-period problem using a grid search.
The accompanying chart depicts the probability that S1/W1 <
S0/W0, for various values of the target/wealth ratio ¯ W/W0. For
smallvaluesofthatratio,thehouseholdfollowsthebehaviorde-
scribed in the preceding paper: the household invests enough of
itsresourcesinbondstoguaranteeachievingthetargetandsplits
its remaining funds between stocks and bonds. We have seen
that this strategy implies that ifthe stock return is higher thanthe
bond returnin any period,then the shareof resources investedin
stocks rises. This happens with probability 2/3 for the speciﬁca-
tion of returns in this example.
For larger values of the target/wealth ratio, however, the
household invests a lot of resources in stocks in the ﬁrst period
in order to maximize the probability of achieving its target. If
stock returns are sufficiently high that it gets over the hump after
theﬁrst period,thenit investsrelatively littleinstocks inthesec-
ond period in order to avoid getting a low return and sliding be-
low the target. If the target is somewhat low, then the household
has a good chance (2/3) of beating the target after one period. If
thetarget/wealthratioishigh,thenthehouseholdbeatsthetarget
withonlyprobability1/3.Thechartshowsthatthehouseholdre-
duces the portion of its wealth in stocks with a high probability
only over a small range of ratio values.
Risk-Free Bonds as Substitutes for Labor Income
Analytically
Now we prove analytically that under certain circumstances in-
vestorsviewrisk-freebondsassubstitutesforriskylaborincome
that is independent of stock returns.
Let y be random labor income, and let r
s be random stock re-
turns.Assumethatthetworandomvariablesareindependentand
that the mean of the stock returns is higher than the risk-free re-
turn r
b. Suppose that the individual has one unit of consumption
to split between stocks and bonds. Let u(x)=x
1−g/(1−g). Deﬁne





Then the partial derivative of g with respect to d is






[Here the (·) represents (1 + yd + sr
s + (1−s)r
b).] Suppose s*(d)




b,it is clear that s*(d) > 0. Our goal is to show that
(A9) g2(s*(d),d) >0 .
If this is true, then standard comparative statics implies that
s*¢(d) > 0, which means that people with higher labor income in-
vest more in stocks.
Toprove thatg2(s*(d),d)> 0for agivend, weimposethe fol-
lowing sufficient condition:









To gain some intuition into this condition, rewrite it as follows:






















The concavity of u guarantees that the conditional covariance is
always negative [becauseu¢ is decreasing iny while y(1+y+r
b)
−1
is increasing in y]. Hence, the ﬁrst term on the right side of
(A11) is positive while the second term is negative. If the con-
ditional covariance were independent of r
s (as it would be if u¢
were linear), then (A11) would always be satisﬁed [because
E(r
s)>r
b]. In fact, though, the third derivative of u is positive,
so the conditional covariance is more negative for low values of
r
s than it is for high values of r
s. (To see this, differentiate the
covariance with respect to r
s, and note that u² is increasing in
y.) This raises the possibility that if u¢ is sufficiently convex and
E(r
s)−r
bis sufficiently small, then (A11) might fail. Note,
though, that (A11) is only a sufficient, not a necessary, condi-
tion to prove that g2(s*(d),d) >0 .
Now consider the following chain of inequalities for arbi-
trary s > 0 and d >0 :
(A12) E{u¢(·)(r
s−r




=E { u ¢ (·)(r
s−r












































b) y = ¯ y}.
Integrating over ¯ y, we conclude that
(A13) g2(s,d)/(−g)=E { u ¢ (·)(r
s−r















































If s = s*(d), then the ﬁrst term is zero (from the deﬁnition of s*)
and (A11) implies that the second term is negative. Hence, we
can conclude that





which proves our theorem. Q.E.D.
Numerically
Finally, we demonstrate numerically the intuition about bond
holdings substituting for risky labor income.We follow Heaton and Lucas (1996) and assume that the
household’s income process is a two-state Markov chain with
realizations 1.25 and 0.75, and the probability of exiting from
one state to another is 0.26. As Heaton and Lucas do, we model
stock returns as being independent and identically distributed
over time with two equally likely realizations, 1.31 and 0.87.
Stock returns are treated as independent of the income process.
We assume that the real return to bonds is constant at 0.6 per-
cent. We assume that the household lives for three periods and
has a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 5. Its initial
level of income is drawn from the stationary distribution of the
income process.
For a wide variety of initial conditions of wealth (ranging
from 0.01 to 100), we simulated 1,000 different sample paths of
returnandincomerealizations.Foreachofthesesamples,house-
holds reduced the portion of their wealth that they hold in stocks
between the ﬁrst and second periods. Intuitively, we know that
the value of their human capital falls dramatically between these
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Understanding Risk Aversion
How do different values of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion lead to different implications for investor behav-
ior? To get a feel for this, consider the accompanying table.
It shows the risk premium that investors with coefficients
of relative risk aversion g demand in order to be indifferent
between investing all of their wealth in a stock with a log-
normal return and all of their wealth in a risk-free bond.
(This assumes that the stock’s log return has a standard de-
viation of 21 percent. Note that the risk premium demand-
ed is approximately 0.5g(0.21)
2.)In the accompanyingarti-
cle, we often focus on the behavior of investors who have
a risk aversion coefficient of 5.The Extra Return Investors Need to Be Indifferent
Between Stocks and Bonds
Risk Aversion Risk Premium












The Horizon Doesn’t Matter Much to Many Investors
Percentage of Wealth Invested in Stocks by Households With
Various Degrees of Constant Relative Risk Aversion and Various
Investment Horizons and No Possibility of Rebalancing Portfolios
Risk Aversion Coefficient (g)
Horizon (T) 234567
1 98.14 65.54 49.04 39.14 32.55 27.86
2 98.18 65.67 49.03 39.05 32.42 27.71
3 98.21 65.79 49.03 38.97 32.30 27.57
4 98.25 65.91 49.02 38.89 32.19 27.45
5 98.28 66.02 49.01 38.82 32.10 27.34
10 98.44 66.50 48.98 38.54 31.70 26.89
20 98.72 67.21 48.94 38.16 31.18 26.33
30 98.95 67.74 48.97 37.97 30.90 26.01
40 99.13 68.08 48.93 37.93 30.93 26.11Horizon (T) Optimal Bond Optimal Bond
1 $1.01 $.981 $1.04 $1.02
5 1.04 .909 1.21 1.12
10 1.07 .827 1.45 1.25
20 1.14 .684 2.07 1.55
30 1.21 .566 2.89 1.90
40 1.27 .468 3.86 2.22
Table 2
A Measure of the Fear of Downside Risk
Minimum Amount Needed to Be Invested in a Stock Portfolio
for That to Be Preferred to $1 Invested in an Optimal
Nonrebalancing Portfolio or a Bond Portfolio
Risk Aversion Coefficient (g)
35Chart 1
The Longer the Horizon, the More Likely 
That Stocks Will Outperform Bonds
Based on a Statistical Model Incorporating Data
on the S&P 500 and U.S. Treasury Bills During 1926–90
and the Random Walk and Rational Expectations Hypotheses
Probability 














Investment Horizon (Periods)Chart 2
How a Typical Household’s Stock Holdings
Should Change Over Time
Percentage of Wealth Invested in Stocks by a Median Household, by Age,
for a Household With an Annual Investment of $20,000 From a Salary
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*This is the median path of stock holdings from 1,000 randomly drawn time paths of stock returns.
%How the Target Size Affects the Probability
of Investing Less in Stocks

















Ratio of Target to Initial Wealth (W/W0)